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Relaxation of the Military Confrontation across the Straits and the CCP’s Policies
   日期:2003-06-26 09:30        編輯: system        來源:

 

  After the first crisis of the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. government all along forced the Chiang Kai-shek clique to withdraw troops from Jinmen and Mazu to create the condition of “ dividing China tnto two entities by the Straits”. The conspiracy was opposed strongly by the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits.

  On August 23, 1958, the People’s Liberation Army bombarded Jinmen intensively, and it was “the second crisis of the Taiwan Straits” that shocked the world. In a bid to safeguard the radical interests of the country and the Chinese nation and frustrate the U.S. government’s plot of “dividing China into tow entities by the Straits”, the CCP worked out in good time a strategy of “cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek to resist the U.S.

  On October 6,1959, “the Message to Taiwan Compatriots” was drawn up by Mao Zedong and released under the name of the then Minister of Defense, making public the new policy on Taiwan. The subsequently released “the Order of the Ministry of Defense of the People’s Republic of China “, “the Second Message to Taiwan Compatriots” and “the Third Message to Taiwan Compatriots” elaborated on the new policy as follows:
1) Stick to the one-China principle and oppose” two Chinas”
2) It is a sacred mission of the Chinese people to realize the reunification of the country.
3) The CCP and the Kuomintang hold talks in order to peacefully liberate Taiwan.
4) Strictly distinguish between the two different types of internal affairs and external affairs of the Taiwan question.
5) The U.S. imperialism becomes the common enemy of the people on both sides of the Straits.
6) Stop bombarding Jinmen for the purpose of dealing with the Americans and benefiting Taiwan troops to defend their position. This is national righteousness.

  The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 had a decisive influence on development of the relations across the Straits. After the bombardment, the leaders across the Straits adjusted their own policy on the common basis of the one-China principle, coordinated with tacit understanding and frustrated the US. Plot of “dividing China into two entities by the Straits” for Taiwan never withdrew its troops from Jinmen. The condition across the Straits hence was shifted from fierce military confrontation to political confrontation as the primary with military confrontation as the subsidiary. The leaders of the Kuomintang gradually abandoned the slogan of “counterattacking the mainland” and laid emphasis on management of Taiwan .In the meantime the CCP put forward many important principles for the settlement of the Taiwan question. On May 22,1960,Mao Zedong presided over a meeting to deliberate the Taiwan question, thinking that “It would be better for Taiwan to be in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and his son than to pass into the hands of the Americans. We can wait for Chang Kai-shek.It may not be up to us to accomplish the task of liberating Taiwan for we can leave it to the next generation. Now it might be difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to come over to us. We can gradually create some favorable conditions. Whin the time is ripe, things can be done easily.”

  Soon, Zhou Enlai summed up the CCP policy toward Taiwan as “one key link, four items”. The one key link refers to that Taiwan must return to the motherland. The four items are: 1) After Taiwan’s return to the motherland, Chiang Kai-shek will hold power over civil and military affairs as well as arrangement of personnel except foreign affairs that must be in the hands of the central government. Chen Cheng and Chiang Ching-Kuo may be put in important position in accordance with Chiang’s opinion. 2) Insufficient amounts concerning military and government expenditures as well as construction funds will be made up by appropriations from the central government. (At that time the deficit amounted to 800 million us. Dollars in Taiwan each year). #) The social reform in Taiwan can be put off and it can only be carried out when conditions are ripe for reform and with the permission of Chiang Kai-shek. 40 Both agree not to send spies to the other side, not to do anything to disrupt the unity of the other side. Mao Zedong repeatedly stated that so long as the Taiwan authorities firmly guard Taiwan and do not let Taiwan be separated from China. The mainland wouldn’t alter its existing policy toward Taiwan. The Taiwan authorities were apprised of the new policy by zhang Zhizhong in a letter to Chen Cheng on January 4,1963.
 

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